When Can a Court Take Judicial Notice
Paragraph (c). This subsection, prepared by Fed. R. Evid. 201 (d) and proposed Mass. R. Evid. 201(f) reflects Massachusetts practice that a court or appellate court may become aware of it at any time. Maguire v.
Director of the Office of Medicaid, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 551 n.5 (2012). Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 69 n.9 (1997). Although there is no explicit authority to support the proposition that judicial notification is discretionary with respect to judicial facts, see Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Fl.
App. Ct. 921, 922 (1998), the principle follows logically from the consistent assertion that, in the absence of disputed facts, the dispute is ripe for a decision of the court. See Jackson v. Longcope, 394 Mass. 577, 580 n.2 (1985) 12[b]); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754–755 (1979) (“The right of a court to consider matters known to the courts is essentially the same as the right of a jury to rely on its common knowledge.”). See also Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 72 (1889) (court heard ex officio that cigars were not drugs or medicines and duly excluded expert opinions to the contrary).
The courts may examine their own files ex officio. See, for example, Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002). But see Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 804 n.6 (2012) (The Court of Appeal will not take note of the contents of the police report contained in the court record if the report has not been presented in evidence or considered by the appellate judge and has not been included in the appeal record). Subsection (d). This paragraph follows from the principle, based on considerations of due process, that a party has the right to inform the matters on which the court will decide. See Department of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 76 n.15 (2000) and cited in the cases cited.
Even in situations where information is appropriate for judicial advice under section 201(b)(2), it should not be provided without notice to the parties and without an opportunity to be heard. Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (referring judge unlawfully took judicial knowledge of judicial facts at the end of the evidentiary hearing and without notifying the parties). Section 201 (g), as received by the Supreme Court, provided that the court was to order the jury to accept that fact as proved if a fact came to the attention of the courts. Considering that a mandatory instruction to a jury in a criminal case to accept any fact established by the courts as conclusive was inappropriate because it was contrary to the spirit of jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, the Committee adopted in 1969 the draft of this subsection of the Advisory Committee, which provides for mandatory instruction in civil actions and proceedings and discretionary instruction in criminal matters. Allows.
This rule is consistent with Uniform Rule 9(1) and (2), which limits judicial knowledge of facts to those which are “so well known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of disputes” which are “so generally known or so generally aware in the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal that they cannot reasonably be the subject of disputes; ” and those who are “able to make an immediate and accurate determination using easily accessible sources of undeniable accuracy.” The traditional treatment of textbooks included these general categories (generally known questions, verifiable facts), McCormick, §§ 324, 325, and then moved on to the detailed treatment of specific topics such as facts relating to court personnel and records, Id. § 327, and other government facts, Id. § 328. The California authors followed a similar pattern in the context of detailed legal regulation of the judicial opinion. California Evidence Code §§451, 452. However, the uniform rules have been developed on the basis of the theory that these particular issues fall into the general categories and do not require special mention. This approach is followed in this rule. Another aspect of what Thayer had in mind is the use of inconclusive facts to evaluate or evaluate the decision facts of the case. Case pairs from two jurisdictions illustrate this use as well as the difference between facts used in this way, which are not evidence, and jurisdictional facts. In Menschen v. Strook, 347 Ill. 460, 179 N.E.
821 (1932), place of jurisdiction in Cook County, had not been proven by testimony that the crime was committed at 7956 South Chicago Avenue, because judicial knowledge that the address was in Chicago would not be accepted. However, the same court later ruled that the location in Cook County was established by testimony that a crime had taken place at 8900 South Anthony Avenue, as the usual practice of omitting the city`s name when dealing with local addresses would be noted and the witness would testify in Chicago. Menschen v. Pride, 16 Fig.2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551 (1951). And in Hughes v. Vestal, 264 A.D. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965), the North Carolina Supreme Court disapproved of the admission of a table of car braking distances published by the State on the basis of a trial judge`s opinion, even though the court itself had referred to the same table in a “rhetorical and illustrative” manner in an earlier case to conclude that the defendant could not have stopped her car in time, to avoid hitting a child who suddenly appeared on the highway and a non-trial was duly granted. Ennis v.
Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 136 S.E.2d 702 (1964). See also Brown v. Hale, 263 N.C. 176, 139 S.E.2d 210 (1964); Clayton v. Rimmer, 262 N.C. 302, 136 S.E.2d 562 (1964). It is clear that this use of facts, which do not constitute evidence, is not an appropriate object for judicial notification formalised in the assessment of the facts relevant to the decision of the case. In criminal proceedings, if the court “becomes aware of a matter ex officio”, it must inform the jury “that it may, but is not obliged, accept any fact established by the courts as conclusive.” G.S. 8C-201(g); see also N.C.P.I.–Crim.
104.97 (Instruction to jury that it “may accept a fact established by the courts as conclusive, but you are not obliged to do so. You should give it the weight you get in conjunction with all the other evidence. Paragraph (b). This paragraph is derived from G. L. v. 43B, § 12; Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 Mass. 1, 10 (2018) (Notice of “Temporary Protected Status” for Aliens issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security and published in the Federal Register); Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass.
368, 375 n.10 (1979), citing Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 122 (1973) (publication of legislative history permissive); and New England Trust Co. v. Wood, 326 Mass. 239, 243 (1950). The term “expressions of general culture” in Uniform Rule 9(1) and (2) is not included in this Rule. It is believed to have originally appeared in Rules 801 and 802 of the Model Code, primarily to recognize the right of the judge, in his or her “legislative” capacity (and not as a trier of fact), to take judicial notice of very limited categories of general knowledge. The restrictions thus imposed were rejected as undesirable, impracticable and contrary to existing practice. What must then be taken into account is the status of a “well-known proposition” as a “judicial” fact that must be ascertained in court and communicated by the judge to the jury.
Seen in this light, it is not considered to have practical significance. Although judges use judicial references to “public knowledge” suggestions in a variety of situations: determining the validity and meaning of statutes, formulating common law rules, deciding whether evidence should be admitted, assessing the sufficiency and effect of the evidence, all are essentially non-judicial in nature. While judicial notice is considered an important vehicle for progress in law, it is these areas that are particularly affected in the development of scientific knowledge. See McCormick 712. It is not believed that judges now inform jurors of “common knowledge” suggestions, or that they are likely or likely to do so, or that it is desirable for them to do so. There is a big difference between deciding on the basis of a judicial notice that radar speed evidence is admissible and explaining the principles and level of precision of the jury, or between using a table of vehicle braking distances at different speeds in a forensic evaluation of the witness` testimony and informing the jury of its exact application in this case. For cases raising doubts about the lawfulness of laymen`s use of medical texts in the transfer of disability claims in administrative proceedings, see Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1967); Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554 (6.